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PROBLEMS WITH EXISTING PREDICTION STUDIES AND FUTURE
RESEARCH NEEDS
LESLIE T. WILKINS*
Most decisions involve risk and are thus subject
to two kinds of error. Prognoses, estimates of future
conditions, and all probability statements are sub-
ject to the same two kinds of error. In criminolog-
ical prognoses, the decisionmaker can be in error
in that: (1) the individual who is predicted to fail
may succeed, or (2) the individual who is predicted
to succeed may fail. These two kinds of error apply
to all decisions or estimates irrespective of the
means by which such decisions or estimates are
derived. In criminology, neither clinical nor statis-
tical methods of prognosis and prediction can avoid
the two classes of error.1 In addition, these two
kinds of error will be present no matter how success
or failure are defined. The first kind of error is
usually termed a "false positive," or "overpredic-
tion." Overprediction will tend to increase in pro-
portion to the decrease in the number of individ-
uals who fit the "fail" category. It is important to
stress that false positives cannot be avoided.
Clinical methods usually are not able to estimate
the magnitude of the errors, whereas statistical
methods do so as an integral part of the process of
calculation of the likelihood of success or failure.
But clinical ignorance of the size of the errors does
not mean that those studies produce a smaller
number of errors than studies applying statistical
prediction. Where comparisons have been made of
the false positive rates, the clinical rates have been
larger in almost all instances.2
THE USE OF PREDICTIVE STATEMENTS
At present, statistical predictions, and also, by
inference, all clinical predictions, produce a large
proportion of false positives. The proportion, to
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IIn industrial decisions, the two classes of error are
often termed "producer" and "consumer" risks, and es-
timates of the magnitude of the two classes are frequently
written into contracts.
2 P. MEEHL, STATISTICAL V. CLINICAL PREDICTION: A
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE
(1954).
some degree, depends on the frequency of the
phenomenon predicted. Violent crimes, for exam-
pIe, occur less frequently than property crimes and
thus tend to show lower levels of predictability.
Some law and criminal justice writers have sug-
gested that because of the presence of false positives
in predictive statements, statements and decisions
having a predictive basis should be avoided in all
dealings with offenders. In other words, these
writers assert that reference should be made only
to the past; it is improper to give consideration to
the possible outcome of a decision. This is the
position taken by advocates of the "just deserts"
theory. It must be realized, though, that despite
the fact that prediction is believed to have been
avoided if it is not directly invoked in the interpre-
tation of previous events, it may, nonetheless be-
come involved (in some ways not completely un-
derstood) in the definitions of "culpability."
Whether prediction really is avoided is not, of
course, the major issue of concern. What is of
concern are the qualities of the decisions, whether
or not they make use of "predictions." Humans
seem to be anticipating creatures, and there is
difficulty with the "just deserts" proposition that
this faculty, for ethical reasons, should be inhibited.
EVENTS AND PERSONS
Individuals cannot validly be classified as "dan-
gerous" or "not dangerous," but their crimes can
be. The commission of a crime is an historical event
that can be analyzed with precision. On this basis,
one might argue that thought should be concen-
trated upon definitions of those kinds of behaviors
(not persons) that require restraint. Of course, the
person (who-prediction or not-will continue into
the unknown future) will be involved in any such
restraining situation. But the logic underlying the
disposition of the case would be independent of
judgments about personality.
Although a crime may be contemplated, legally
defined, and discussed independently of the of-
fender, in operational terms the actor cannot be
separated from the act. However, one can discrim-
inate between micro and macro models in terms
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closely analogous to those of economic theory.' One
could propose methods of dealing with the issues
of crime that do not involve a clear concept of the
individual offender. The focus instead would be
placed upon the features of situations common to
many crimes. In this manner, it might be possible
to take action about crime (macro models) inde-
pendently of action attempting to deal with the
individual offender (micro models). However, this
type of approach remains relatively unexplored.
MEASURES OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF CRIMES
Researchers who have attempted to provide
scales of the seriousness of crimes have relied upon
ratings by samples of assessors.4 A single dimension
of "seriousness" has been postulated in which the
act is described without any reference to an actor.
A nebulous generalized actor must be assumed.
However, it is doubtful that the people who are
recruited as assessors find it possible to imagine a
disembodied act. Raters probably fit a stereotyped
actor to each instance of crime presented in the
sample of acts. This produces an unknown sample
of actors (offenders) who have been supplied by
the imagination of the assessors making the ratings
of the crimes. For example, the crime stimulus
"theft of $I.00" poses the image of the kind of
person who could or would steal $1.00; and the
stimulus, "theft of $10,000" poses the image of the
kind of person who could or would steal $10,000.
The two offenders "supplied" to match the stimu-
lus are not likely to be the same kind of person.
Thus, assessments of the seriousness of acts may
well be confounded with attributes of offenders as
ascribed by raters. The implications of this may be
of considerable significance for all seriousness
scales.
3The distinction between micro and macro models
may be illustrated by noting that the skill necessary to
operate a village grocery store is not an adequate quali-
fication for a director of the budget. The economic theory
that leads to success in a small business is not the same as
the theory that is required to guide a national policy. The
domestic detail of individual purchases (so much appre-
ciated in a village community) does not rise to the level
of the kind of sophisticated abstraction necessary to form
the basis of a national marketing policy.
Perhaps too much debate in jurisprudence is at the
level of the village grocery store theory. Consider, for
example, the fondness for references to "little old ladies"
and to the man who rides the local omnibus. This sort of
homeliness characterizes many opinions on crime policy
and legal philosophy.
4 T. SELLIN & M. WOLFGANG, MEASUREMENT OF DELI-
QUENCY (1964).
Theories of "just deserts" propose that the sever-
ity of the penalty should match the seriousness of
the crime, but even according to these theories, the
measurement of seriousness must include some con-
cept of culpability, an offender-related character-
istic. Indeed, a crime ceases to be defined as such
if the culpability of the offender is reduced to zero.
But such reduction of culpability does not, or does
not greatly, modify the seriousness of the harm
done. The transition from crime to harm and the
relationship between the concepts of culpability
and seriousness need greater consideration and re-
search.
IMPROVEMENTS IN PREDICTION
There are many reasons why the strategy of
avoiding predictive statements may not be realistic
or even desirable. If one accepts this position, it is
necessary to confront the problem of false positives
and consider what is ethical under conditions of
uncertainty. The replacement of probability by
some subjective certainty is not a satisfactory ap-
proach.
First, one should estimate the magnitude and
probable impact of the false positive prognosis,
both upon individuals and upon the social and
legal system. The present position is that for every
person correctly identified as dangerous (likely to
commit another crime against the person), six oth-
ers will possess the same predictive profile. This
was the conclusion of a very thorough and intensive
testing involving a large sample of young offend-
ers.5 Given this background, one can consider
whether this level of precision can be increased
and, in addition, what other modifications can be
made to deal with the difficulties arising from
imprecise judgments.
It is quite probable that the precision of predic-
tion methods can be improved significantly. There
are three areas where it would be necessary to
invest effort: (a) the basic data, (b) methods of
input of basic data to analytical systems, and (c)
the analytical systems.
THE BASIC DATA
The data used in making predictions can give
rise to several problems. A first problem arises from
the fact that existing case papers, the basic source
documents for information used in predictive stud-
ies, do not seem to have the accuracy necessary to
5 Wenk & Emrich, Assaultive Youth, 9 J. RESEARCH
CRIME & DELINQUENCY 171 (1972).
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withstand analyses by means of the more powerful
methods. The information may be mixed with
"noise" as well as redundancy. It therefore may be
worthwhile to explore the common kinds of record-
ing errors and how they influence predictions based
on case papers.
A second problem arises from the fact that some
items of information may be predictive, but "un-
desirable" for inclusion in an analysis. Race, for
example, may be such an item. Any characteristic
that the individual cannot change voluntarily may
be regarded as suspect on ethical grounds. The
correlations may reflect the position of the individ-
ual in the "real world" and include factors quite
independent of the criminal justice processes. Data
obtained in criminal justice research may reveal
injustice that cannot be remedied by any action
within the criminal justice system. The criminal
justice system is not operating in a perfect society.
Where data problems arise from these sources, one
must ensure that legal and ethical considerations
are permitted to outweigh considerations of effi-
ciency.
A third problem arises from the fact that some
improvements in predictive power may require the
use of information that causes an unjustifiable
intrusion upon the personal privacy of an individ-
ual. But it is also possible that where offenses have
been proven against an individual (prediction of
recidivism), some of the rights safeguarding the
privacy of personal information are diminished.
This is a matter that jurisprudence must decide.
METHODS OF INPUT (CODING)
Methods of input raise two problems for predic-
tion. First, all prediction systems have used data
with a fixed time base: the files have been searched
for information in one operation, and these data
have been coded as information input for analyses.
Dynamic procedures of data recording may have
potential for more efficient prediction. Where in-
dividuals are incarcerated (or in mental hospitals),
it is possible to obtain data on transitional states.
The problem with this is that the cost of such data
collection, as well as probable ethical objections,
raises concerns that may outweigh the probable
increments in predictability.
A second problem stems from the fact that some
important information may be lost by coding proc-
esses which tend to make implicit assumptions (e.g.,
A + B = B + A, where A precedes B in time).
Coding stage assumptions such as additivity and
transitivity are not removed by analytical methods
that avoid such assumptions.
ANALYTICAL SYSTEMS
Research has been directed towards refining the
statistical methods of analysis, and work in other
fields of application has provided new techniques.
The results, however, have been disappointing.
Little or no difference can be observed between the
power of quite sophisticated methods (e.g., log
odds, discriminant function) and very simple sys-
tems (e.g., point allocation as in the Guidelines of
the United States Parole Commission and unit
weights as used fifty years ago). It is possible that
this result is due, in part, to the quality of the basic
data; simple methods are more resistant to "noise"
in the data base. Clearly, this problem needs in-
vestigation, which can be done rather simply and
inexpensively through the use of simulation meth-
ods.
Although it is known that all methods of predic-
tion provide estimates of approximately equal pre-
dictive power, the relationship between the meth-
ods as they apply in individual cases has not been
investigated. The different methods of prediction
correlate quite highly with each other, but not
perfectly. Thus, there must be some proportion of
cases predicted as "failures" by one method but as
"successes" by another. It is possible to guess at the
nature of these differences through the use of math-
ematical theory, but a thorough practical exami-
nation of the matter seems long overdue.
SOME ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS IN PREDICTION AND
DECISION
The prediction of recidivism of offenders has
been subject to a wide range of error. But a much
greater accuracy has been obtained in the predic-
tion of the decisions of authorities in the criminal
justice system (e.g., judges, parole officers, proba-
tion officers). Why decisions about offenders (such
as sentencing and parole revocations) have proved
more predictable than decisions by offenders (to
commit crime) is unknown. A cross-analysis of data
involving samples of these two classes of predictions
has not been undertaken. Indeed, there is little
research specifically directed at methods of or issues
in prediction. What is known about prediction has
arisen mainly from studies in which prediction
methods were incidental to some other focus. Thus,
an investigation devoted solely to methods of pre-
diction might prove worthwhile.
Many authorities assume that if outcome could
be predicted with reasonable accuracy, it would be
a simple matter to determine the best course of
action. But it is questionable whether improved
prediction techniques would provide useful infor-
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mation in many circumstances. In the early days
of prediction in criminology, it was thought that if
parole boards had prediction tables, this would
assist their decisions. But parole boards did not
make use of the available methods. The decisions
made by parole boards were concerned with issues
other than "mere prediction of recidivism." This
became clear in the work that led to the develop-
ment of Guidelines for the United States Parole
Commission. While the guidelines include a pre-
dictive element, it is the lesser of the two major
dimensions considered; the main one being the
seriousness of the instant crime.
Modern decision theory and related practical
methods can assist in decisionmaking where the
objectives are clearly stated. Prediction methods
may be useful or even essential as a subset of other
analytical techniques. In this way, it may be pos-
sible to develop more efficient and ethical rules of
decision and procedure. The main issue today is
not how to make predictions (the techniques of
prediction are known, and there already are good
ideas for improving present methods), but rather
why to predict and when. An answer to the ques-
tion of why to predict will help answer the question
of what to predict.
It also may be desirable to simulate the condi-
tions of decisionmaking where decisionmakers are
required to respond to information controlled for
type, probable error, and situation. Prediction
technique should not be seen as something that
will stand up on its own. The decision environment
in which the methods of prediction are to be
embedded is also an essential element of the pro-
gram of research and assessment that is now re-
quired.
One final question seems to be of outstanding
importance. The question is whether prediction
should be considered in the disposition of offenders.
This question is related to many subquestions that
might challenge the relationship between ethical
concerns and probability or degrees of belief. But
in the final analysis, the theory of "just deserts"
does not appear, either practically or ethically, to
have disposed of the necessity of prediction.
